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Student loan debtor's wage offset upheld under
federal law
by Tisha Pates Underwood
In Sibley v. U.S. Dep't of Educ.,
913 F. Supp. 1181 (N.D. III. 1995),
the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division upheld a decision
by the Department of Education and
a subsequent review by an administrative law judge ("AL") that a
federal employee's salary may be
offset to collect a debt on a federally
insured student loan where the
employee failed to establish that
such garnishment would cause
"extreme financial hardship." In so
doing, the court examined the
appropriateness of the ALJ's
application of the statutory procedures and found them to be neither
arbitrary and capricious nor violative of the employee's constitutional
rights.

Department offsets wages
of student debtor
In the 1980-81 academic year,
George Sibley ("Sibley") borrowed
$9,337 from a commercial lender as
part of a student loan program
guaranteed by the Illinois State
Scholarship Commission ("lender").
In turn, the federal government
guaranteed payment of the loan to
the ISSC. In 1982, the ISSC
reimbursed the lender after Sibley, a
then full-time Internal Revenue
Service employee, defaulted on the
loan. From 1982 to 1988, the ISSC
negotiated repayment plans with
Sibley. Finally, in 1988, the Department of Education ("Department")
notified Sibley that if he and the
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Department could not agree upon a
repayment plan, the Department
would deduct, or "offset", 15% of
his "disposable pay" from each
paycheck. The Code of Federal
Regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 31.2(5),
defines "disposable pay" as the
amount remaining from a federal
employee's salary after deductions
for federal, state, and local taxes,
social security taxes, retirement
program contributions, and life and
health insurance premiums.
In response, Sibley requested that
the Department refrain from
imposing the 15% offset, alleging it
would cause him "extreme financial
hardship." A series of transactions
occurred between the initial request
in 1989 and this court action in
1995, including: written correspondence between Sibley and the
Department, an internal and independent review of Sibley's hardship
request, written demand for oral
hearing, a request for a review by
the Department's regional office, a
refusal to participate in a telephone
hearing before an ALJ, and a request
to be re-assigned to a new AL. In
1994, after considering all of
Sibley's requests, the ALJ held that
the 15% offset would not cause
extreme financial hardship.
Subsequently, Sibley filed this
pro se action in federal court
contesting the hardship decision. He
alleged that the Department's
procedures were arbitrary and
capricious. Sibley also claimed the
Department denied him due process
and equal protection under the law,

the ALJ's ruling constituted cruel
and unusual punishment, and the
salary offset subjugated him to
slavery under the Thirteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Department moved for
summary judgment, and the court
granted the request.

Department decisions not
arbitrary or capricious
The court limited its review of
the agency determination and
recognized the Department's
reasonable interpretations of its own
regulations. First, the court examined the appropriateness of the
ALJ's decision to offset Sibley's
salary. Second, the court reviewed
the overall process used by the
Department in its course of dealings
with Sibley. Based on these two
considerations, the court held that
the Department's decisions were not
arbitrary or capricious. In reviewing
the decision, the court examined
whether the ALJ considered the
"relevant factor" and whether she
made a clear error of judgment
under the circumstances.
The court grounded its analysis in
the definition of "extreme financial
hardship," as found in 34 C.F.R. §
31.8(b)(1) and promulgated pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. § 5514(b)(1). This
section explains that an employee
would suffer "extreme financial
hardship" if a wage offset "would
prevent the employee from meeting
the costs necessarily incurred for
essential subsistence expenses." In
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addition, a relevant factor in
determining extreme financial
hardship is whether the expenses
"have been minimized to the
greatest extent possible." Under 34
C.F.R. § 31.8(b)(2), these expenses
are defined as the costs of "food,
housing, clothing, essential transportation, and medical care."
An employee requesting a
hardship dispensation bears the
burden of proving that the offset
would cause extreme financial
hardship. In assessing the merits of
the ALJ's ruling, the district court
found that the ALJ's holding that
"Sibley could endure the offset
without suffering extreme financial
hardship" was reasonable. Sibley,
913 F. Supp. at 1187.
The court held that the Department properly considered these
relevant factors - namely Sibley's
$48,109 annual gross salary, his
extraordinary expenses (e.g., $525
per month for food for himself
alone), and his inability to provide
relevant documentation supporting
and rationalizing his extraordinary
expenses. Accordingly, the ALJ
correctly reduced Sibley's asserted
"essential expenses." In addition,
Sibley did not provide receipts for
his alleged dental care expenses and
did not prove the extent to which his
health insurance covered those
expenses. Nevertheless, the ALJ
allowed $500 per month for medical
expenses. Thus, this consideration of
Sibley's medical and other subsistence expenses constituted an
adequate review of the relevant
factors in this case. In light of the
ALJ's "well-reasoned conclusion"
based on a review of these factors,
the ALJ's determination was neither
arbitrary and capricious nor clearly
erroneous under the circumstances.
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Department's procedures
were appropriate
After contesting the validity of
the agency's determination, Sibley
attacked the Department's procedures as arbitrary and capricious.
The court rejected Sibley's arguments. The court held that the
Department promptly and correctly
stayed the wage offset and internally
considered Sibley's hardship request
on two separate occasions. The court
also found that Sibley had benefited
from numerous continuances and
that the denial of other continuance
requests was appropriate. Finally,
the court determined that the ALJ
provided adequate time for Sibley to
submit supporting materials which
Sibley failed to take advantage of
and that a telephone hearing was
adequate under the circumstances.
Accordingly, the Department's
overall procedures used in managing
Sibley's situation were not arbitrary
or capricious.

Constitutional challenges
rejected
The court relegated Sibley's
procedural due process concern to a
footnote where, applying the three
factor test of Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976), the court held
that "Sibley received the process he
was due." Sibley, 913 F. Supp. at
1187.
Sibley also claimed that a ten
year statute of limitations barred the
Department from collecting his debt.
However, the court disagreed and
held that, even under Sibley's
interpretation, the statute had not run
because the Department sent its first
notice well before the expiration
date. More importantly, the court

found Sibley's statute of limitations
defense meritless because Congress
repealed all limitations periods that
were "previously applicable to a suit
... , offset, garnishment, or other
action initiated or taken" by the
Department for repayment of
federally insured student loans under
20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(2)(D). Thus,
the retroactive application of the
repeal does not violate due process.
Sibley also claimed that the
statutory provision permitting the
Department to collect a federal
employees' debt through a wage
offset system violated his Fifth
Amendment right to equal protection under the law. However, the
court held that the federal employee
classification was not a classification subject to heightened review as
a protected class under the U.S.
Constitution. The court found that
collecting funds owed to the federal
government is a legitimate government purpose and that salary offsets
"constitute a rational manner to
effectuate the government purpose."
Therefore, the Department did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Sibley also raised an argument
based on the equitable defense of
laches, but the court found that
neither laches nor the traditional
rules of subrogation are necessarily
applicable against the federal
government. In addition, the court
held that, even assuming that the
right of subrogation was applicable
in this case, Sibley waived his right
to assert the defense, and that no
harm or prejudice occurred to Sibley
caused by the lapse in time. Therefore, the court denied Sibley's laches
defense.
Finally, Sibley claimed that the
Department's decision to offset his
salary constituted cruel and unusual
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punishment under the Eighth
Amendment and subjected him to
slavery in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment. The court disposed of
these claims as "patently meritless"
for two reasons. First, the court
found that Sibley received adequate
protection in this case. Second, the

Thirteenth Amendment generally
protects against labor compelled by
the "use or threatened use of
physical or legal coercion." The
court also dismissed Sibley's
Thirteenth Amendment claim after
finding that the salary offset did not
coerce Sibley to work for the

government.
In sum, the court held that no
compelling basis existed for setting
aside the Department's decision to
offset Sibley's salary. Therefore, the
court entered summary judgment
was entered for the defendant.

Cosigners protected against primary liability
by Jennifer L. Schilling
In Lee v. Nationwide Cassel, L.P., 660 N.E.2d 94
(I11.
App. Ct. 1995), cosigners to loans sought damages
from Nationwide Cassel, a credit finance company, for
violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and the
Illinois Sales Finance Agency Act. The trial court
dismissed the complaint because the cosigners failed to
set out facts necessary to state a claim under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act. The appellate
court reviewed each of the trial court's findings and
subsequently held that the trial court erred in dismissing
the cosigners' claim.
The plaintiffs, Rodney Lee and Edelmira Rivera,
("the cosigners") in separate and unrelated circumstances acted as "cosigners" to loans financed through
the defendant, Nationwide Cassel ("Cassel"). Both Lee
and Rivera, signed as cosigners to a loan for a motor
vehicle financed through Cassel in order to help a friend
obtain credit approval. The cosigners brought action
against Cassel for damages because Cassel requested
that the cosigners sign as "buyers" and subsequently
attempted to make them primarily responsible for the
loan. The cosigners claimed that Cassel violated § 18 of
the Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act ("Motor
Vehicle Act"), which serves to protect cosigners from
being held primarily responsible for defaulted loans.
Under the statute, cosigners are only held primarily
responsible if they "actually receive the vehicle" or if
they are the spouse or parent of the cosigned individual.
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/18 (West 1992). The
cosigners asserted that Cassel's violation of § 18
amounted to "unfair and deceptive" practice under the
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act
("CFDPA").
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The trial court identified three reasons for dismissal:
(1) dismissal was the only course of action consistent
with the holding of Magna Bank of McLean County v.
Comer, 600 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); (2) the
cosigners' signatures on the loan documents indicating
that they were "buyers" established that they had
"actually received" the vehicles; and (3) the cosigners'
complaint failed to allege fraud with sufficient particularity to state a claim under the CFDPA. The appellate
court reviewed each finding and ultimately reversed the
trial court's dismissal of the claims.

Fraud and misrepresentation are not
requisite elements
The trial court rejected the cosigners' claims for relief
based on the holding in Magna Bank of McLean County
v. Comer, 600 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), which
provides that § 18 of the Motor Vehicle Act is an
applicable defense from primary liability only when the
seller engages in fraud or misrepresentation. The
appellate court rejected the analysis in Comer and held
that § 18 clearly requires "actual receipt" to establish
primary liability. Liability does not depend on whether
fraud or deceptive practices are involved. 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 375/18 (West 1992). The appellate court
held that, under § 18, a signatory who (1) takes "actual
receipt"; or (2) is the parent or spouse of the individual
who takes possession of the vehicle may be primarily
liable. Any other individual who signs the sales agreement is only secondarily liable. An obligation only arises
for parties who are secondarily liable after the seller,
using reasonable and diligent efforts, has exhausted all
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